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ABSTRACT
This paper eatimates cost functions for day care centers in Masaachuaetta.
The production technology aaauiued is the generalized homothetic Cobb-Douglas
production function. The cost function dual to this production function is
estimated separately for profit-making (P1Os) and not-for-profit (NPOa)
organizations. The results are discusse n the context of current NPO
literature. NPOs are found to be operating at higher average coats than PMOa
for most output levels as predicted by the literature. However, the proviaion
of more staff per child hour, our measure of quality, increases coats by
similar amounts in PMOs and NPOs. Further, present forms of subsidies do not
help either PMO5 or NPO5, and in fact, promote 'shirking' in NPO5. PMOs are
not optimizing with reference to the amount of education and experience in
their personnel. The results suggest that experienced labor may be working for
less than its marginal product in the day care industry.
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Theneedfor affordable child care arrangements has escalated in recent
years as a result of two demographic trends: the rapid, continuing increase
in maternal employment in the last decade and a half and an even higher
increase in the number of single parent households.1 Crucial to the
affordability issue is the need to study the factors underlying the cost of
providing high quality daycare. This paper focuses on these cost determinants
in the case of day care centers in Massachusetts. The latter comprise a
significant subset of all day care options2 caring for 16% of infants, 31% of
toddlers, 66% of pre—schoolers and 7% of schoolgoing children in non—parental
care.3 Since not all the daycare centers are profit oriented, this was an
excellent opportunity to study both profit (PMO) and not—for—profit (NPO)
organizations co—existing in the same industry. Most previous work has
focused on modeling the demand for child care (e.g. ,Robinsand Spiegelman,
1978 and Henriques and Vaillancourt, 1988). Two exploratory studies analyzing
the costs of providing day care are now over a decade old. See Robins and
Weiner (1978) and Ruopp, (1979). Robins and Weiner sought to determine
the factors affecting the price (rather than cost) of day care. Their sample
targeted low income families in Denver and Seattle. Their model is, however,
really a revenue function and not a cost function as their dependent variable
measures weekly revenues of the center. A revenue function includes the net
profit or net loss of the center which a cost function does not. The second
study, by Ruopp, isthe 1977 National Day Care Study by Abt Associates,
which uses a random sample of licensed centers. Both studies adjusted for
heterogeneity in output by including a staff/child ratio as an indicator of
quality. They also included the average experience and educational levels of
the staff. In the present study, cost functions for both profit and nonprofit2
day care centers have been estimated separately, refining the measurements of
quality, and comparing and interpreting the results in the context of current
literature, in particular, the shirking and property rights models for NPOs.
When property rights are reduced, negative consequences may occur
(Clarkson 1980). See mes and Susan Rose—Ackerman (1986) for a concise
survey of existing empirical studies testing various implications of the
property right model as applied to NPOs.4 As regards the relative costs of
the PMO5 and NPOs, they may be expected to behave in exactly the sameway if
entry is restricted and when maximum expected profits are zero. But in the
long run, if donations are present, or if the nonprofit Status is taken by the
consumers as signalling higher quality, one may expect higher costs in NPOs.
These costs may be higher for various reasons: shirking, quality becoming an
important NPO objective, or technological preference for particular factor
mixes (e.g., generous expense accounts, sophisticated decor, etc.). The
present study extends the scope of current empirical studies of the relative
performance of PMOs and NPOs to the daycare industry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical
issues and the major factors determining the costs of day care centers.
Section III describes the data and the empirical formulation of the model.
The results are in Section IV and Section V concludes the paper andsuggests
extensions.
II. The Theoretical Underpinnings
At its simplest, a firm's total cost function may be denoted as:
TC —f(Q,P1)3
i.e. ,totalexpenditures (TC) are related to he level of output Q,theCost
of its inputs P1, and the type of production technology represented in the
functional form, f.Specification of a cost function does not imply any
restriction on the market structure. However, the derivation of a supply
curve from a cost function involves the assumption of competitive conditions
which, prima facie, does not seem appropriate in this subsector of the day
care industry. Thus we make no attempt to estimate a supply curve. The
latter would require a careful formulation of the appropriate model for the
day care industry and a simultaneous estimation of both supply and demand.5
The simple formulation of the total cost function involves certain
restrictive assumptions. Output must be homogenous, all differences in factor
inputs fully reflected in their price and factor—embodied technology absent.
The daycare industry does not fit this mold. Output is not homogeneous,
either within or between firms, and it is possible that total Costs are
affected by the education and experience of the staff even after controlling
for wage level. The technology of day care production is the manner in which
day care is provided. Though some of the technology may be disembodied (i.e.
independent of the level of education and experience of the staff) some may
not be so separated from the factors of production.
In selecting an appropriate functional form,weconsidered the different
restrictions that various functional forms impose. The simplest, the
generalized Cobb—Douglas production function, allows returns to scale to be
increasing or decreasing for all output levels, but does not let them depend
on the output level. Further, the elasticity of substitution is constrained
at unity. Functional forms that allow returns to scale and/or the elasticity
of substitution to vary with output are available. One may choose from the4
class of homothetic functions allowing returns to scale to vary withoutput.
Even more attractive theoretically are the flexle forms which place few
restrictions on technology. See for example, the translog (Christensen,
Jorgensen, and Lau, 1973), the generalized quadratic (Denny, 1974) and the
generalized Leontief (Diewert, 1971). However, the large number of parameters
to be estimated in a flexible form call into question the precision of
estimates in a reasonably sized data set. The other problem that arises is in
the presence of a wide range of observations in the data set, in whichcase
the flexible forms may fail to fulfill certain restrictions (e.g.,diminishing
marginal physical product). These considerations led us to consider the class
of homothetic functions as good candidates for selection. We chose the
generalized homothetic Cobb—Douglas functional form, first proposed by Zellner
and Revankar (1970).
The cost function dual to this production function has the following
specification:
IC —Bo+BiYi+B2lnY+(lnP)'B3+(1nX)'34+E
where TC is the dependent variable denoting total costs; Yj isoutput; P is
the vector of explanatory price variables; X is the vector ofnon—price
explanatory variables; 0' i are parameters to be estimated; B3, B4 are
vectors of parameters to be estimated and E is the random disturbance term.
III. The Data and Empirical Formulation of the Model
The data are for a random sample of day care centers in Massachusetts.6
The dependent variable, total costs, is the weekly expenditure of eachcenter5
summing up all labor, capital, supplies, food, transportation, utilities,
phone, liability insurance and other costs. The independent variables are
discussed below.
The output of a center is the total number of child hours provided by the
.enter during the year. This is the sum of the hours spent by all children
resident at a center in that year.
The price of labor is the personnel costs, fringe benefits and payroll
taxes divided by total paid staff hours. To arrive at the total capital cost
for a center, we add up rent/mortgage payments, utilities, and maintenance and
repair costs. This aggregate is divided by the total number of rooms to
yield the price of capital. Adding up costs of supplies, equipment, food,
phone services and transportation, and then dividing by the number of children
gives us the price of materials.
Day care centers receive a range of subsidies: state food program
allocations, donations, funds from endowments, supplies brought in by parents,
volunteer hours and DSS7 funding. Since these subsidies fall naturally into
two groups, two subsidy variables were created. Subsidy 1 is a binary
variable equal to one if the center used volunteer hours and zero if the
center did not. Subsidy 2 is a binary variable equal to one if the center
received State funding items (state food and DSS), financial subsidies such as
endowments and loans, or funding from private organizations or the United Way.
These subsidies may be expected to lower costs for P!4Os, but orima—facie, it
is not possible to say how they may affect NPOs. In the latter case the use
of subsidies may actually increase costs (for example, they may be used for
staff perquisites). Costs may also rise due to unmeasured improvements in
quality. For instance, better and more varied play equipment may be bought.6
Since output of day care centers is not homogenous, one has to control
for quality. Quality is a multi—dimensional concept, and in the day care
situation, good quality care may be envisioned as one where the child receives
individual attention and interaction, emotional support and care, the teaching
of universally accepted values, and the fostering of individuality,
creativity, etc. Measuring these is beyond the scope of this study, but one
may try to isolate objective factors or attributes that create or encourage
such a nurturing environment. An important one is the degree of interaction
of the provider with the child. Previous studies have used the staff to child
ratio as a quality measure. This does not take into account the reality that
the staff also spend time away from the children in administrative duties and
that all children do not require the same degree of care and supervision. To
capture these features, the ratio of weekly paid staff hours in the classroom
to the number of children (weighted) is computed.8 We realize that this ratio
may not capture all the aspects of quality.
The next two variables relate to education and experience. To reflect
the diverse educational levels of the staff in any daycare center, we
construct a variable that indicates the average education of the staff. The
experience variable is created by taking the weighted average of the total
years of experience -possessed by the staff. This reduces the range of staff
experience in any one center to a scalar. It is unclear how parameter
estimates on these two variables should be interpreted. They may be
reflecting technology embodied in labor. In that case, there is the
possibility that as more technology is incorporated into labor, certain
aspects of quality (for example, the fostering of creativity in children) may
be enhanced. Alternatively, this labor embodied technology may lower costs.7
The coefficients on these variables may also measure marginal productivity not
included in labor price. To the extent these two variables measure quality,
we would expect a positive relationship to costs. However, to the degree they
reflect cost—reducing technological change- or differences in marginal
productivity not reflected in labor price, we would expect negative
coefficients.
IV. The Results
A. For—Profit Centers (PMOs)
The model was estimated by OLS. The regression results are reported in
Table 2. The residual plots did not indicate significant heteroskedasticiry
and therefore no data transformations were made. The adjusted R2 is 0.83 and
the F statistic is significant at any reasonable level of statistical
significance. The collinearity diagnostics using eigen values (following
Belsley, , 1980)do not show any significant multi—collinearity.
Turning to the coefficients on output and input prices, the results are
generally as expected. Total cost goes up with an increase in any factor
coat. The elasticities of total cost with regard to capital and material
prices are 0.24 and 0.17 respectively, whereas the elasticity of total cost
with respect to labor price is the highest, at 0.81. This is not unexpected
considering labor costs constitute the largest share of total costs. Further,
increases in output reduce average costs significantly, indicating the
presence of economies of scale. See Figure 1.
As the ratio of the paid staff class hours to weighted children
(henceforth called QUALR) increases, costs go up. A 10% increase in QTJALR
would lead to a 3.7% increase in total costs. Assuming equilibrium in the day8
care market, these results imply an insignificantly different market valuation
(or the marginal willingness to pay by consumers of day care) for increasing
staff—child ratio
The coefficients of both education and experience variables are
significant and negative. Recall from our earlier discussion that a negative
coefficient could reflect cost—reducing technical change and/or differences in
marginal productivity not captured in labor price. It is not possible,
however, in the present model, to separate Out the two effects.
B.Not for Profit Centers (NPOs)
The regression results for the NPOs are reported in Table 2. The
adjusted R2 is 0.82 and the F statistic is significant at any reasonable level
of statistical significance. As in the previous case, the results with regard
to material and labor costs are consistent with economic theory. However, the
elasticities of total cost in relation to all input prices are much lower for
NPOs than PMOs. Total costs go up by 2.6% when labor costs increase by 10%.
This is less than a quarter of the rate of increase experienced by PMOs. As
for PMOs, total costs are affected to a smaller degree (2.0%) when material
costs increase by the same magnitude. An increase in the price of capital,
though, has no significant effect on costs. NPOs like PMOs experience
increasing returns to scale. However, note in Figure 1 that the average cost
of NPOs is greater than that for PMO5 for most output levels.
NPOs share three results with PMO5: there are economies of scale; as
the staff—child ratio increases, costs are affected positively; as average
experience increases, costs go down.9 However, they differ from PMOs in that
an improvement in education has no significant effect on costs)° This9
appears to indicate that quality improvements acted as an offsetting force.
The fac: that the coefficient on education is insignificant also suggests that
NPOs may have increased the education level to its optimum, in contrast to
PHOs who have not done so. Another difference between the two forms of
organizations is that contributions of volunteer hours actually increased
costs.
C. Comparison of PMO5 and NPO5
Since the day care industry gave us an excellent opportunity to study a
case where both PMO5 and NP0s Coexist, we can examine the results further in
the light of current literature on NPO5. The first question we sought to
answer was whether the cost functions of the two types of centers were the
same or whether the two samples had been drawn from different populations. To
test for the equivalence of the two regression equations, we used the Chow
test11 and found the relevant F statistic significant at the .01 level. This
lent justification to the separate treatment of PMOs and NPOs, and implies
that if PMOs are minimizing costs, then the other centers are not doing so.
Indeed, 4POs do, for most ouput levels have higher average costs than PHOs
(See Figure 1).
Will giving donations worsen matters? In this context, James and Susan
Rose—Ackerman12 succinctly summarize current theoretical thinking on NPOs.
Shirking is possible in the long run only if there are
barriers to entry, if donations are positive for some
organizations, or if some customers prefer nonprofits as
more 'trustworthy.' Ironically, donations and trust make
things worse rather than better in this respect. In
effect, 'shirking' is one possible use of donation and
other revenues induced by trust.10
Further,
Put another way,— in situations where a profit oriented
market will not produce efficient amounts (as where
externalities exist) mechanisms (such as voluntary
donations) that allow increased production also allc
productive inefficiency (excess capacity, shirking) anc
society faces a trade—off between the two kinds of
inefficiency.
Donations in our sample are given in different ways: as direct funding
and/or as aid in the form of volunteer hours. Our results show that donations
have no effect on PMO5. In NPOs, however, volunteer hours have the effect of
actually increasing costs thus providing support to the 'shirking' hypothesis.
On the other hand, in both PMOs and NPOs, a reduction in the price of labor
would decrease costs. Therefore, any form of subsidy that reduces the cost of
labor should reflect in a cost reduction in both forms of organization. A
reduction in the price of capital, however, does not reduce appreciably costs
in an NPO. These results impel us to conclude that in the main, present forms
of subsidy are not helping to lower day care costs at all, and in fact are
promoting 'shirking' in NPOs. Designing subsidies that help decrease
costs must lower effective prices of labor, materials and capital in a PMO,
and that of labor and materials in an NPO.
Where quality is observable, NPO models usually agree that PO managers
may tend to overemphasize quality which leads to higher costs for NPOs
relative to PMO5. On the other hand, where quality is easily obseried and
measured as in the Hansmann model,13 consumers are unable to make enforceable
contracts in regard to these characteristics. This could be the case in areasU.
such as health and education, and PMOs in these industries would then have a
tendency to downgrade quality, whereas NPOs would have an attenuated pecuniary
incentive to do the same.
The d.aycare industry can be categorized as one where quality may be
observed (with cost), but may not be enforceable contractually. Our results
indicate that, improving quality increases costs for both organizations.
However, a 10% increase in the staff—child ratio increases total costs by 3.3%
in an NPO, as against 3.7% in a PMO. Since the test of the null hypothesis
that the two parameters are equal cannot be rejected, increases in the staff—
child ratio at PMOs and NPOs imply similar increases in costs. This suggests
similar market valuations of quality under competitive market conditions.
Accumulation of experience decreases costs significantly for both
organizations. This indicates that both should value experience for its cost
reducing potential. Recall (see Table 1) that the average experience was
significantly higher in PMO5. This is consistent with attempts to maximize
profits by PMO5. However, our results suggest that both PMOs and NPOs could
lower costs further by increasing the experience of their staff. We do not
have the data to furnish an explanation for center's failure to hire more
experienced staff. We speculate there may be supply constraints in the labor
market. We have already discussed the fact that PMOs are not optimizing with
regard to education either, and it now appears that NPOs place a greater
emphasis on education over experience.
We are left with an intriguing picture. The average wage is
significantly higher in NPOs than PMOs (see Table 1).PMOs are not optimizing
with regards to either education or experience, and NPOs are not optimizing
with regards to experience. An explanation could be that all centers are12
constrained from hiring staff with the desired level of experience because of
market constraints. Interestingly, bOOs appear to have been able to hire
staff with cost minimizing levels of education while PMOs have not been able
to do so.
V. Conclusion
The present study estimated cost functions for PMOs and MOOs in the day
care industry in Massachusetts from cross—section data collected in 1987 and
1988. The results ste discussed in the context of the MOO literature. The
two forms of organization are seen to be drawn from different populations:
the parameters of the estimated coat functions are significantly different.
One may surmise that if the PMOs are cost—minimizing, their non—profit
counterparts are not doing so since they are operating at higher average cost
for most output levels. See Figure 1. Giving financial subsidies like
donations, loans etc. do not help reduce costs. Present forms of subsidy are,
at best, quite ineffective. To lower costs, subsidies must lower the effective
prices of material, labor and capital for PMOs. For MOOs, however, the
options are narrower. Only subsidies that affect labor and material prices
would serve to lower costs. In fact, donation of volunteer hours actually
elevates costs in MPOs. This lends credence to the 'shirking' models.
Clearly the most effective method of lowering child care costs is to lower the
unit labor cost faced by both NPO end PMO producers. A recent study in
Massachusetts (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women end Center for
Survey Research, University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1988) suggests that
this may best be accomplished by providing MOOs with wage grants and PMOs with
tax credit related to their labor costs.13
Raising the staff—child ratios increases costs of both PMOs and NPOs. As
predicted by the NPO literature, PliOs have lower ratios of paid staff class
hours to the number of children.14 If PMOs are providing the "correct" staff—
child ratios then NPOs are overproducing quality. This is consistent with the
contention in the not—for—profit literature that NPOs will overproduce
quality. Having staff with more education and experience reduces costs in
PROs, whereas NPOs seem to benefit only from staff with greater experience.
Consistent with cost minimization, we would then expect PROs to have more
experienced and educated staff in an attempt to lower costs. In practice, the
staff of PROs does have more experience on rhe average. However, the staff of
PROs and NPOs do not differ significantly in average education.
There are a number of possible explanations for the negative coefficients
on education and experience. One possible explanation is that more
experienced and better educated staff are receiving wages that are less than
their marginal product, particularly, in for—profit centers. It is
interesting in this regard that average wages are significantly higher in NPOa
than in PMOa.
Several issues require further research. The fact that the output in the
daycare industry requires both client and provider inputs makes this a special
case of joint production, compounding the usual difficulties of measuring
output in service industries. Further, an analysis of coat functions is only
a first step towards building a complete model of price determination to be
used for a full examination of the affordability issue.14
Footnotes
1. "Among working women with husbands present and children under 6, 30% were
in the labor force in 1970. By 1984, 48% of such women were working. The US
Congressional budget office predicts that by 1990, 55% of this group will be
working and 60% of all new labor force entrants will be women. See page 1 of
Marshall etal. (1987).
2. The range of options open to parents could include, apart from formal
center—based care, those provided by family daycare whether licensed of
unlicensed, care by relatives and baby sitters at home. See pages 4—8 of
Marshall (1987).
3.Infants children between 0—14 months.
Toddlers 15—32 months.
Preschoolers 33—59 months.
4. For instance, see Frech (1980), and Blair, Ginsburg and Vogel (1975) for
the health insurance industry. Clarkson (1980) and Bays (1979) have studied
nonprofit hospitals and Feigenbaum (1983) medical charities.
5. This is the subject of a separate paper by the authors.
6. The data set contains information for centers selected randomly from two
sampling frames. The first sampling frame was the licensing lists of the
Massachusetts Office for Children. The data for 86 centers from this sarrDling
frame are used. The second was the centers used by a random sample of
Massachusetts families with children under the age of thirteen. The data for
27 centers were selected from this sampling frame. The addition of the second
set of centers in February 1988, tends to overcome well—known deficiencies in15
the licensing list sampling frames (e.g., incomplete and out—of—date lists).
See Marshall, etal. (1987) for details.
7.The Department of Social Services (DSS) provides funding for families
based on need. This subsidy is given directly to the centers.
8. The weights were obtained by regressing the total number of infants,
toddlers, pre—schoolers, kindergartners, and school age children to paid staff
class hours.
9. Je cannot reject the null hypothesis that the parameters of the experience
variable are equal in PMOs and NPOs.
10. The null hypothesis that the education parameters across the two
equations are equal is rejected at the .01 level of significance.
11. See Gregory C. Chow (1960).
12. See page 38 of James and Rose—Ackerman (1986).
13. See Hansmann 1980, 1986.
14. The relevant null hypothesis is not rejected at the .10 level of
statistical significance.16
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Variable PMO Sample NPO sample
TOTEXP 1583.69 3684.32 —0.36 Total Expenditure
(1425.19) (5603.87) Per Week
CHRS 1689.51 1347.78 0.41 Total Number of
(5174.70) (1486.67) Hours Children Are
Cared For Per week
FLAB 6.35 9.74 3.22 Total Labor Costs
(2.76) (8.13) Per Hour
PCAP 337.97 243.74 1.08 Price Per Room Per
(364.20) (553.77) Month
PMAT 55.90 18.40 0.96 Expenditure for
(250.71) (18.07) Materials per
Month per Child
QUALR 0.56 0.75 —1.73 Ratio of Paid
(0.52) (0.54) Staff Classroom
Hours/Children
QUALED 4.38 4.44 —0.11 Average Education
(1.16) (1.15) of Staff
QUALEX 7.33 6.18 2.20 Average Experience
(2.70) (2.63) of Staff
SUBIDUN 0.46 0.57 Dummy Variable —I
(0.50) (0.50) If Had Donation
of Time by Volun-
teers or Parents
SUB2DUM 0.15 0.44 Dummy Variable —1
(0.36) (0.50) Received Any State
or Private FundingTable 2
Cost Function Estimates for Day Care Centers in Massachusetts
Coefficient Estimate t—value for test of
(]tI in parentheses) difference of estimates
Variable PMO Sample NPO Sample
Constant 9.399 4.743 1.918
(4.211) (4.972)
CHRS 0.0008 0.0002 2.000
(2.609) (2.768)
LNCHRS —0.502 0.227 0.908
1.798) (1.911)
LNPLAB 0,798 0.252 2.516
(4.231) (2.436)
LNPCAP 0.216 0.075 1.240
(2.140) (1.402)
LNPMAT 0.154 0.180 0.200
(1.895) (1.801)
LNQUAL.R 0.326 0.252 3.895
(2.178) (2.260)
LNQUALED —0.929 0.033 2.253
2.756) (0.125)
LNQUALEX —0.609 —0.290 1.130
2.759) (1.657)
SUB1DUM —0.163 0.270 1.959
( 0.937) (1.963)
SU82DIJM 0.101 0.187 0.273
(0.374) (1.134)
0.8204 0.7954
]adj. R2] (0.7585] [0.7499]
F 13.250 17.492
[Prob >F] [0.0001] [0.0001]Are Japanese Stock Prices Too High? 3/90
Non-Cointegration and Econometric 3/90
Evaluation of Models of Regional
Shift and Share
Determinants of Saving and Labor Par- 3/90
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Inventories and the Short-run Dynamics 3/90
of Commodity Prices
Stock Returns and Real Activity: A 3/90
Century of Evidence
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Statistical Illusion?
Investment Tax Credit in an Open 3/90
Economy
Does Foreign Exchange Intervention 3/90
Matter? Disentangling the Portfolio
and Expectations Effects for the Mark
Premature Liberalization, Incomplete 3/90
Stabilization: The Ozal Decade in Turkey
Patent Statistics as Economic 3/90
Indicators: A Survey Part I and II
From Stabilization to Growth 3/90
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The International Comparison Program: 3/90
Current Status and Problems
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